Year-end: 25bp (previous: 37bp)

Next meeting (October): 76% hold (previous: 71% hike)

2027 cumulative: 80bp (previous: 92bp)

Year-end: 19bp (previous: 33bp)

Next meeting: 79% hold (previous: 54%)

2027 cumulative: 65bp (previous: 99bp), the largest drop in the group

Year-end: 31bp (previous: 34bp)

Next meeting: 82% hike (previous: 80%)

2027 cumulative: 92bp (previous: 106bp)

Year-end: 26bp (previous: 35bp)

Next meeting: 65% hold (previous: 65% hike)

2027 cumulative: 110bp (previous: 140bp)

Year-end: 33bp (previous: 37bp)

Next meeting: 52% hike (previous: 81%)

2027 cumulative: 106bp (previous: 125bp)

Year-end: 21bp (previous: 21bp)

Next meeting: 82% hold (previous: 68%)

2027 cumulative: 90bp (previous: 99bp)

Year-end: 10bp (previous: 41bp, including 25bp delivered on September 30)

Next meeting: 75% hold

2027 cumulative: 24bp (previous: 65bp)

Year-end: 4bp (previous: 10bp)

Next meeting: 85% hold (previous: 62%)

2027 cumulative: 56bp (previous: 84bp)

Comments from Williams ("no need for urgency" after the September hike, only one more hike possibly appropriate by year-end) then Jefferson (more data needed before the next move) pushed October hike odds from 70% down to about 25%

A complete reversal from last week, when the PMIs, ADP, PCE and revised GDP had pushed the Fed toward the hawkish camp

The Fed's weight on global markets triggered a dovish repricing across every other central bank

Hopes of a phased deal on reopening Hormuz and easing the blockade, with a US proposal presented to Iran's cabinet by Araghchi

Trump heavily qualifies this, saying he must decide whether to "blow Iran up or make a deal," with the conflict ending "very soon, one way or the other," and bombing possibly resuming after the midterms

Consistent with the timeline already documented in this series, de-escalation expectations and oil keep moving in tandem with each statement

Inflation is almost entirely driven by the energy shock, with core relatively stable, which justifies waiting

Financial conditions are deteriorating, with the OAT/Bund spread at its highest since 2012 and fears of a new debt crisis

The dilemma is clear: raising rates could worsen sovereign funding stress, which explains the 2027 pricing falling from 99bp to 65bp despite a eurozone PMI at 53.1 and S&P Global's call for an October hike

The article dates from Friday morning (12:59) and predates the 14:30 NFP, already analyzed in this series (+29K versus +90K expected, wages +0.1%, unemployment 4.2%)

After the NFP, October hike odds fell to around 15%, so the dovish repricing described here deepened further during the session

The figures in the article therefore represent a floor of the dovish move, not its end point

USD: bearish short-term bias, the Fed lost its hawkish engine on two fronts at once (official messaging and the labor market), CPI is now the only scenario able to revive October

EUR: mixed pressure, a less hawkish ECB weighs on the currency, but the weaker dollar offers relative support to EUR/USD

GBP: the BoE stands out as the only central bank in the group with a very likely near-term hike (82%), creating a contrast with the flash UK PMI at 51.7 and growth of just 0.1%

AUD, NZD: the repricing is massive on AUD (75% hold after the September 30 hike), while the RBNZ stays more divided at 52% hike odds

CAD: 2027 cumulative sharply lower (140bp to 110bp), but still the highest in the group alongside the RBNZ

CHF: hold odds at 85%, the SNB remains the most relaxed central bank, consistent with Swiss CPI at 1.0%

The RBA comparison is distorted: 25bp were delivered on September 30, so next-meeting probabilities should be read rather than raw cumulatives

The dovish mood rests on a single thread, optimism around US-Iran talks, which Trump can cancel with one statement, oil rising again would immediately revive the hawkish bias

French risk (OAT/Bund spread at its highest since 2012) is a new factor to watch, it could turn a simple ECB pause into a genuine European financial stability problem

Sources